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HUSKY INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONICS, INC. V. RITZ: 
RETHINKING ACTUAL FRAUD, BADGES OF FRAUD, AND 
PLEADING STANDARDS IN FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY 
LITIGATION 
MEAGAN GEORGE 
Bankruptcy law seeks to achieve a balance between two undesirable 
outcomes: debtors so encumbered by debt that they can never again become 
productive, solvent members of society and rightful creditors being unable 
to collect on the loan that they extended with the expectation of being 
repaid.1  In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act to amend 
the existing Federal Bankruptcy Code.2  One of the amendments Congress 
made was in Section 523(a)(2)(A), where it added “actual fraud” to a list of 
actions excepting a debtor from discharge of their debt.3  The updated 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) now states: “A discharge” of a debt under the 
Bankruptcy Code “does not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or 
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false 
representation, or actual fraud . . . .”4 
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 1.  Understanding Bankruptcy, BANKR. C.D. CAL., http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/ 
understanding-bankruptcy (last visited May 17, 2017) (“The primary purposes of the law of 
bankruptcy are: to give an honest debtor a ‘fresh start’ in life by relieving the debtor of most debts, 
and to repay creditors in an orderly manner to the extent that the debtor has property available for 
payment.”).   
 2.  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.  Notably, the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 created the federal bankruptcy courts and “revised and codified 
Title 11 of the U.S. Code which contained the substantive and procedural laws of bankruptcy.”  
Landmark Judicial Legislation: The Establishment of Bankruptcy Courts: “An Act to Establish an 
Uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies”, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ 
history/home.nsf/page/landmark_20.html (last visited May 17, 2017).   
 3.  S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 78 (1978) (“‘[A]ctual fraud’ is added as a ground for exception 
from discharge.”).  
 4.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
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The meaning of “actual fraud” in this context has been an area of 
contention since the term’s addition in 1978.5  Federal courts of appeal have 
disagreed over whether actual fraud requires the debtor to make a 
misrepresentation to her creditor.6  In Husky International Electronics, Inc. 
v. Ritz,7 the Supreme Court settled this dispute, holding that actual fraud 
does not require a misrepresentation to the creditor.8  The Court thereby 
created the option of recovery for creditors under Section 523(a)(2)(A) even 
where they had not been directly lied to, as long as the debtor still 
implemented actual fraud in relation to its debt.9 
The Supreme Court came to the right decision in its holding in Husky, 
but it also opened the door to creditor recovery under Section 523(a)(2)(A) 
in situations where a debtor might be innocent but vulnerable.10  This overly 
wide net is a result of “badges of fraud,” a set of objective factors courts 
and state legislatures have used to evaluate fraud in bankruptcy.11 When 
taken in aggregate, badges of fraud indicate that a debtor was fraudulent, 
but they could also be present due to circumstances completely unrelated to 
fraud.12  To remedy this disconnect between the intentional fraud that 
Congress meant to prevent with Section 523(a)(2)(A) and the types of 
debtors that can now be held liable under it, Congress should enact a new 
pleading standard similar to that used in securities litigation.13  Private 
securities litigants must plead a “strong inference” of fraudulent intent,14 
which places more responsibility on judges and juries to determine whether 
the debtor had intent to act fraudulently, rather than unwittingly meeting a 
list of “badges of fraud.”15  A “strong inference” pleading standard would 
                                                          
 5.  See infra Part I; see also Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (2016) 
(“Although ‘fraud’ connotes deception or trickery generally, the term is difficult to define more 
precisely.”). 
 6.  See generally Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995) (holding that a creditor must justifiably 
rely on a debtor’s representation for that debt to be excepted from discharge under Section 
523(a)(2)(A)); McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that actual fraud 
under Section 523(a)(2)(A) is not limited to misrepresentations); In re Lawson, 791 F.3d 214 (1st 
Cir. 2015) (holding that actual fraud under Section 523(a)(2)(A) is broader than 
misrepresentations). 
 7.  136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016). 
 8.  Id. at 1590. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  See infra Part II.B. 
 11.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (West 1987) (integrating badges of 
fraud into its exception to discharge statute). 
 12.  Brief of Amicus Curiae The National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys in 
Support of the Respondent, Daniel Lee Ritz, Jr. at 5, Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 
1581 (2016) (No. 15-145), [hereinafter Bankruptcy Attorneys’ Brief] (“Every constructive 
fraudulent conveyance will too readily become recast as ‘actual fraud’ . . . .”). 
 13.  See infra Part II.C. 
 14.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 15.  See infra Part II.C.3. 
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reduce instances of litigation abuse and clearly set the tone of Congress’s 
objectives for its inclusion of “actual fraud” in Section 523(a)(2)(A).16 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part will discuss the development of the term “actual fraud” and 
its meaning under Section 523(a)(2)(A).  First, it will look at common law 
interpretations of “actual fraud,” which the Supreme Court relied upon in 
Husky.17  Second, it will examine Congress’s purpose in adding actual fraud 
to Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.18  Next, it 
will highlight the differences in interpretation among the Federal Courts of 
Appeals as to the meaning of actual fraud and its place in Section 
523(a)(2)(A).19  Finally, it will summarize the Husky case, its procedural 
background, and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in deciding that actual 
fraud does not require a misrepresentation.20 
A.  The Evolution of “Actual Fraud” in Bankruptcy Cases at Common 
Law 
Actual fraud is a “common-law term.”21  The Supreme Court 
traditionally interprets common law terms to “imply elements that the 
common law has defined them to include.”22  American bankruptcy law has, 
since its beginning, drawn on Statute of 13 Elizabeth, written in England 
during the sixteenth century.23  In relevant part, Statute of 13 Elizabeth 
“invalidate[s] ‘covinous and fraudulent’ transfers designed ‘to delay, hinder 
or defraud creditors and others.’”24  Most American bankruptcy and 
fraudulent transfer statutes are modeled after Statute of 13 Elizabeth 
because they include a “fraudulent transfer” exception to discharge.25  
Because fraudulent transfer exceptions to discharge have been a 
                                                          
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See infra Part I.A. 
 18.  See infra Part I.B.   
 19.  See infra Part I.C–D. 
 20.  See infra Part I.E–F. 
 21.  Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586–88 (2016) (discussing how 
common law has defined “actual” and “fraud” to arrive at a common law meaning of “actual 
fraud”). 
 22.  Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995).  
 23.  BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 540 (1994). 
 24.  Id. (quoting 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570)). 
 25.  Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1505–06 (1st Cir. 1987); see, e.g., 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 109A, § 3 (1996) (replicating Statute of 13 Elizabeth’s language in its 
fraudulent transfer statute). 
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fundamental piece of bankruptcy law from the start, the Supreme Court has 
generally relied on Statute of 13 Elizabeth as an interpretive guide.26 
Actual fraud was further defined in Neal v. Clark27 in 1877.  The 
Supreme Court in Neal held that the defendant was not guilty of “actual 
fraud” because he “[did] not show that he entertained any purpose himself 
to commit a fraud, or to aid . . . in committing one.”28  The Court found that 
actual fraud, unlike constructive fraud, includes behavior “involving moral 
turpitude or intentional wrong,” such as embezzlement.29  Neal suggests 
that actual fraud is not a question of merely the actus reus.30  It requires 
mens rea and is distinct from constructive fraud.31  Neal is crucial to the 
interpretation of “actual fraud” in this context because it was the blueprint 
for Section 523(a)(2)(A).32 
Many courts, when interpreting a statute’s common law terms, look to 
the Restatement of the statute’s respective area of law as a reference point 
for the term’s general common law meaning.33  When Congress amended 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts defined fraudulent misrepresentations.34  It 
did not, however, reference the term “actual fraud.”35 
                                                          
 26.  Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587. 
 27.  95 U.S. 704 (1877). 
 28.  Id. at 707. 
 29.  Id. at 709. 
 30.  Id. at 707 (discussing that the defendant “purchased the bonds in good faith, not doubting 
the power or the right of the executor to sell, and having no reason to believe that he meditated 
any wrong to those interested in the estate which he was administering.”). 
 31.  Id. at 709 (explaining that “fraud” in the statute at issue meant “positive fraud, or fraud in 
fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong . . . not implied fraud, or fraud in law, which 
may exist without the imputation of bad faith or immorality.”). 
 32.  124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (1978) (“Subparagraph (A) [of § 523] is intended to codify 
current case law e.g., Neal v. Clark, which interprets ‘fraud’ to mean actual or positive fraud 
rather than fraud implied in law.” (citation omitted) (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 (1887)). 
 33.  Restatements are “influential treatises published by the American Law Institute 
describing the law in a given area and guiding its development” which are “frequently cited in 
cases and commentary.”  Restatement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 34.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (defining fraudulent 
misrepresentation as “mak[ing] a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law for the 
purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from action in reliance upon it”). 
 35.  See generally id.  Because the Court did not have a clear Restatement definition to work 
with when interpreting what “actual fraud” meant in Husky, it had to look into other common law 
sources, such as Statute of 13 Elizabeth, and employ other canons of construction, such as the 
section’s syntax, to discern the meaning of the term.  Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 
1581, 1586–88 (2016). 
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B.  The Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and 
Its Implications for the Court’s Interpretation of Section 
523(a)(2)(A) 
In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to 
amend the Federal Bankruptcy Code.36  According to the Court, “[w]hen 
Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to 
have real and substantial effect.”37  Before the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) included “false pretenses” and “false 
representations.”38  The term “actual fraud” was “added as a ground for 
exception from discharge” during the amendment process.39  Congress 
noted the potential for abuse of Section 523(a)(2)(A) by creditors, but still 
reinforced their position that debts obtained by “false pretenses, false 
representations, or actual fraud” should be excepted from discharge.40  
Congress’s purpose was not to limit the types of “actual fraud” that could 
be brought as an exception.41 
C.  The Court Interpreted Section 523(a)(2)(A) Narrowly in Field v. 
Mans 
In Field v. Mans,42 a Supreme Court case from 1995, the plaintiffs 
were actively misled by defendant through a letter asking them to waive 
their right of sale on their real estate property, after defendant had already 
sold the property without plaintiffs’ consent.43  The Court in Field held that 
the plaintiffs needed to show justifiable reliance on a debtor’s 
misrepresentation for the debt to be excepted from discharge under Section 
523(a)(2)(A).44  That was the extent of the Court’s holding.45  The Court did 
not consider whether a misrepresentation was necessary for eligibility for 
exception from discharge under Section 523(a)(2)(A); the Court only 
                                                          
 36.  S. REP. NO. 95-989 (1978). 
 37.  Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (citations omitted) (citing Moskal v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 103, 109–11 (1990); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)). 
 38.  S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 78 (1978). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id.  Congress wanted exceptions from discharge where “discharge would violate the 
bankruptcy objective of giving a fresh start only to honest debtors,” including fraud.  H.R. REP. 
NO. 102-1085, 102nd Cong., at 50–51 (1992). 
 42.  516 U.S. 59 (1995). 
 43.  Id. at 61–62. 
 44.  Id. at 61. 
 45.  Id. at 78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing how the only issue resolved was the level 
of reliance and that the court did not take up any causation questions once it resolved the level of 
reliance needed). 
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considered the level of reliance a creditor must put on a misrepresentation, 
if there was one, for the debt to be excepted from discharge.46 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg recognized the limits of the 
Court’s holding in Field and foreshadowed the uncertainties of Section 
523(a)(2)(A) that would later be at issue in Husky.47  She expressly stated 
that the Court, in Field, had only answered the question of the necessary 
level of reliance on a misrepresentation when the creditor’s claim is based 
upon a misrepresentation.48  She concluded that the “unsettled causation” 
issue is not resolved and must be decided in another case.49 
D.  The Seventh and First Circuits Interpret Section 523(a)(2)(A) as 
Not Requiring a Misrepresentation for Actual Fraud 
Five years after the Supreme Court heard Field v. Mans, federal 
appellate courts began deciding cases involving the “unsettled causation” 
issues, as Justice Ginsburg anticipated.50  In McClellan v. Cantrell,51 the 
Seventh Circuit held that “actual fraud” is “not limited to 
misrepresentations and misleading omissions.”52  It gave weight to the fact 
that Congress added “actual fraud” into the statute during the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act, concluding that, “by distinguishing between ‘a false 
representation’ and ‘actual fraud,’ the statute makes clear that actual fraud 
is broader than misrepresentation.”53 
The First Circuit heard a similar case, In re Lawson,54 at the same time 
the Supreme Court heard Husky.55  The First Circuit, like the Seventh 
Circuit, held that “‘actual fraud’ under [Section] 523(a)(2)(A) is not limited 
to fraud effected by misrepresentation.”56  The court found that the “fraud” 
                                                          
 46.  Id. at 73–75 (holding narrowly that “[Section] 523(a)(2)(A) requires justifiable, but not 
reasonable, reliance” and vacating and remanding the case for the lower court to evaluate 
plaintiffs’ reliance on defendants’ misrepresentation using a justifiable reliance standard).  
 47.  Id. at 78–79. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See, e.g., In re Lawson, 791 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Ritz, 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 
2015); McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 51.  McClellan, 217 F.3d 890. 
 52.  Id. at 893. 
 53.  Id.  The bankruptcy court that heard McClellan before its appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
read Field v. Mans to mean that a debt could not be excepted from discharge without a “showing 
of material misrepresentation and reliance on the statement.”  Id. at 892.  The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed with this interpretation because, as noted by Justice Ginsburg, Field dealt only with “the 
nature of the reliance that a plaintiff must show to prove fraud in [a Section 523(a)(2)(A)] case.”  
The Seventh Circuit concluded that “Field has nothing to do with this case.”  Id. 
 54.  791 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 220. 
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definition in the Restatement of Torts dealt with fraud broader than just 
misrepresentations, including “fraudulent interference with property 
rights.”57  It also relied on Collier on Bankruptcy, a leading bankruptcy 
treatise, which provides, “[a]ctual fraud, by definition, consists of any 
deceit, artifice, trick, or design involving direct and active operation of the 
mind, used to circumvent and cheat another.”58  By using these common 
law sources, the First Circuit aligned itself with the Seventh Circuit.59 
E.  Lower Court Decisions in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. 
Ritz 
In In re Ritz,60 the case that would ultimately become Husky 
International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion of the First and Seventh Circuit regarding the misrepresentation 
question.61  It found that, for a debt to be excepted from discharge under 
Section 523(a)(2)(A), there must be a misrepresentation and actual fraud 
does not include any fraudulent acts other than misrepresentation for the 
purpose of Section 523(a)(2)(A).62  To fully appreciate the scope of the 
issue presented in Husky, a detailed discussion of the case at issue follows. 
Defendant Daniel Lee Ritz Jr. (“Ritz”) was a director of Chrysalis 
Manufacturing Corp. (“Chrysalis”).63  He was also in financial control of 
Chrysalis and owned at least thirty percent of its common stock during the 
relevant period.64  The plaintiff, Husky International Electronics, Inc. 
(“Husky”), contracted to sell and deliver electronic device components to 
Chrysalis, and transacted with Chrysalis from 2003 through 2007.65  
Chrysalis failed to pay Husky for $163,999 worth of components.66  Husky 
sued Chrysalis to recover that debt in May of 2009.67  Unfortunately for 
                                                          
 57.  Id. at 219 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, index, “Fraud” (AM. LAW INST. 
1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 58.  Id. (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.08(1)(e) (Alan A. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2015)).  
 59.  Id. at 216 n.1.  
 60.  787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. 
Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016). 
 61.  Id. at 321 (“For all of these reasons, we conclude that a representation is a necessary 
prerequisite for a showing of ‘actual fraud’ under Section 523(a)(2)(A).”). 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  In re Ritz, 459 B.R. 623, 626 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d, 513 B.R. 510 (S.D. Tex. 
2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. 
v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re Ritz, No. 14-20526, 2016 
WL 4253552 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016). 
 64.  Id. at 627. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  In re Ritz, 513 B.R. at 523–24. 
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Husky, Ritz transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars of Chrysalis’s 
assets to seven other companies, which he also controlled, between 
November of 2006 and May of 2007, and ignored Chrysalis’s debts.68  After 
Husky sued to recover its debts, Ritz filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.69  
Husky filed an adversary proceeding to Ritz’s bankruptcy claim to recover 
the $163,999 owed by Chrysalis, hoping to pierce the corporate veil and 
hold Ritz personally liable for Chrysalis’s debts.70 
This case began in Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Texas 
in 2011, where Ritz’s bankruptcy case was “routine” until Husky filed its 
adversary proceeding.71  Husky pursued several different routes to recover 
its debts.72  The bankruptcy court quickly dismissed Husky’s attempt to 
recover under Section 523(a)(4), an exception to discharge limited to parties 
with a fiduciary relationship, which did not apply because there was no 
fiduciary relationship between the parties.73  The second route and the true 
area of contention in this case was whether Ritz’s fraudulent transfer of 
Chrysalis’s assets to his other companies fell within the scope of the 
meaning of “actual fraud” in Section 523(a)(2)(A).74  The Bankruptcy Court 
found that Husky could not recover under Section 523(a)(2)(A) because, 
according to Texas law, “actual fraud” requires a false representation 
intended to induce the creditor to enter into a debt agreement.75  Because 
there was no evidence of a representation made by Ritz to induce Husky to 
enter into the contract, Husky could not recover under the “actual fraud” 
language in Section 523(a)(2)(A).76 
                                                          
 68.  In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 628. 
 69.  Id. at 627. 
 70.  Id.  Adversary proceedings include, among other things, actions “to determine the 
dischargeability of a debt” or “to object to or revoke a discharge.”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.  
“Piercing the corporate veil” refers to the principle that “the corporate veil may be pierced and the 
[owner] held liable for the corporation’s conduct when . . . the corporate form would otherwise be 
misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholder’s 
behalf.”  United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 52 (1998).  According to current case law, the 
Texas Business Organizations Code (“TBOC”) allows for the corporate veil to be pierced if “(1) 
the corporation is the alter ego of its owners and/or shareholders; (2) the corporation is used for 
illegal purposes; and (3) the corporation is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud” and “the 
defendant shareholder ‘caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did 
perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder.’”  
In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 632 (quoting Rimade Ltd. v. Hubbard Enters. Inc., 388 F.3d 138, 143 (5th 
Cir. 2004)).  
 71.  In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 627. 
 72.  Id. at 632–33. 
 73.  Id. at 633. 
 74.  Id. at 632–33.  
 75.  Id. at 633. 
 76.  Id. 
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Husky appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas, which affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court.77  Slightly 
straying from the bankruptcy court’s course of logic, the district court 
acknowledged that there are cases where a party can pierce the corporate 
veil because of actual fraud without a misrepresentation.78  The district 
court did not find that there was actual fraud, however.79  Instead, it 
followed the canon of construction that a statute created by Congress must 
be interpreted according to its common law meaning.80  In this case, the 
district court relied on The Restatement (Second) of Torts.81  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts only references fraudulent misrepresentation, 
not actual fraud.82  The district court, therefore, held that a 
misrepresentation was necessary to show actual fraud.83  Because Husky 
provided no evidence of a misrepresentation, the court concluded, Ritz 
could discharge its debt.84  Husky appealed to the Fifth Circuit.85 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy and district 
courts.86  The Fifth Circuit held that Congress did not intend for fraudulent 
transfers to fall within the scope of “actual fraud” in Section 523(a)(2)(A) 
because another provision of the Bankruptcy Code, Section 727(a)(2), 
prohibits discharge of debt involving fraudulent transfers, and statutes 
should be construed to avoid redundancy.87  The Fifth Circuit 
acknowledged its decision was in conflict with the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in McClellan v. Cantrell, which expanded the interpretation of 
“actual fraud” to include fraudulent transfers.88  It contended, however, that 
McClellan contradicted the Supreme Court’s decision in Field v. Mans.89  
Finally, the Fifth Circuit felt it was important to honor the purpose of 
bankruptcy law, which is to give the debtor a clean start.90  To achieve this, 
                                                          
 77.  In re Ritz, 513 B.R. 510, 517 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d 
and remanded sub nom. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. In re Ritz, No. 14-20526, 2016 WL 4253552 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016). 
 78.  Id. at 537. 
 79.  Id. at 538. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 539. 
 85.  In re Ritz, 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Husky Int’l 
Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re Ritz, No. 14-
20526, 2016 WL 4253552 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016). 
 86.  Id. at 314. 
 87.  Id. at 320–21. 
 88.  Id. at 317. 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. at 321. 
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courts should err on the side of giving debtors the opportunity to start anew 
when considering an ambiguity in the statute.91  Recognizing the need to 
resolve the circuit split regarding the issue of “actual fraud,” the Supreme 
Court granted Husky’s petition for certiorari.92 
F.  The Supreme Court’s Reasoning in Husky International Electronics, 
Inc. v. Ritz 
In Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, holding that the term “actual fraud” in 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code includes schemes like 
fraudulent transfers where no misrepresentation is involved.93  The Court 
first analyzed the meaning of “actual fraud” under the common law, then 
interpreted it within the context of the rest of the Bankruptcy Code.94  It 
concluded that neither the common law nor the Bankruptcy Code precludes 
actual fraud from including fraudulent transfer schemes or other types of 
fraud without misrepresentations.95 
The Court relied on the general principle that the judiciary interprets 
statutes based upon their common law meanings, so the Court split up the 
term “actual fraud” into “actual” and “fraud” in an effort to discern the most 
accurate common law meaning for the term.96  In the fraud context, 
“actual,” in contrast with “constructive,” refers to behavior that “involv[es] 
moral turpitude or intentional wrong.”97  As for “fraud,” bankruptcy 
common law has always recognized the transfer of assets to impede a 
creditor’s ability to collect its debts as “fraud.”98  The Court referred to 
Statute of 13 Elizabeth, which it described as deeply influential in modern 
bankruptcy law, to show the long-standing concept that transfers to hide 
assets from creditors is fraud.99  The Court also noted that common law 
indicates that fraudulent transfers do not require a misrepresentation to be 
considered fraud.100  In this case, the Court noted that the common law 
reflects common sense because the wrongfulness of a fraudulent transfer 
like Ritz’s is not in the inducement to enter into a contract, but in the 
                                                          
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (2016). 
 93.  Id. at 1590. 
 94.  Id. at 1586–89. 
 95.  Id. at 1590. 
 96.  Id. at 1586. 
 97.  Id. (quoting Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878)). 
 98.  Id. (noting that the historical meaning of “actual fraud” has included within its scope “a 
transfer scheme designed to hinder the collection of debt”). 
 99.  Id. at 1587. 
 100.  Id. (“[T]he common law also indicates that fraudulent conveyances, although a ‘fraud,’ 
do not require a misrepresentation from a debtor to a creditor.”). 
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secrecy of hiding assets.101  Opportunities for representations are limited in 
a fraudulent transfer, so representations are not a “defining feature of this 
type of fraud.”102 
After the Court determined that the common law does not exclude 
fraudulent conveyances from “actual fraud,” it examined how “actual 
fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) fits into the scheme of the Bankruptcy 
Code and whether construing “actual fraud” broadly to include fraudulent 
transfers was logical under the statutory scheme.103  The defendant 
contended that that interpreting “actual fraud” to include fraudulent 
conveyances would be duplicative of other provisions in the bankruptcy 
code; namely Sections 523(a)(4), 523(a)(6), or 727(a)(2).104  The Court 
discussed meaningful differences between Section 523(a)(2)(A) and these 
other sections, and concluded that, just because the provisions cover 
transfers or conveyances does not make them redundant.105  For example, 
Section 523(a)(4) only covers fraud while acting as a fiduciary, while 
523(a)(2)(A) has no such limitations.106  Section 523(a)(6) covers willful 
and malicious injury, regardless of whether the injury was a result of fraud; 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) only covers fraudulent acts.107  Section 727(a) is 
broader than Section 523(a)(2)(A) in that it prevents a debtor from 
discharging all debts, but narrower because it limits the fraudulent time 
frame of relevance to one year.108  The separate sections of the statute all 
have meaningful differences, indicating that recognition of fraudulent 
transfers under Section 523(a)(2)(A) would not be redundant.109  
The defendant also argued that Section 523(a)(2)(A) cannot include 
conveyances because it is limited to debt “obtained by” fraud, and in a 
fraudulent conveyance, the debt is already possessed.110  The Court declined 
to follow this argument based on two cases.  First, it cited McClellan v. 
Cantrell for the proposition that a third party who receives assets from a 
fraudulent transfer is someone who “obtained” debt by fraud, which leads 
to the conclusion that the “obtained by” language is not “wholly 
incompatible” with fraudulent transfers.111  Then, the Court disputed the 
                                                          
 101.  Id. (“In such cases, the fraudulent conduct is not in dishonestly inducing a creditor to 
extend a debt.  It is in the acts of concealment and hindrance.”). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 1588–89. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 1588. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 1588–89. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 1589. 
 111.  Id.  
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defendant’s reliance upon Field v. Mans, which the defendant cited as 
support for the rule that actual fraud must relate to the “inception of a credit 
transaction.”112  The Court distinguished the rule created in Field, because it 
only applies where fraud is perpetrated by a misrepresentation to a creditor, 
not in all cases under Section 523(a)(2)(A).113 
The Court concluded by discrediting the defendant’s final argument: 
that Congress intended the phrase “or actual fraud” to mean “by actual 
fraud.”114  The Court noted that Ritz’s statutory interpretation argument was 
unprecedented and would not work in this situation.115  After rejecting all of 
the defendant’s interpretive hurdles obstructing fraudulent conveyance’s 
inclusion in “actual fraud,” the Court concluded that fraudulent 
conveyances are within the scope of Section 523(a)(2)(A) and reversed and 
remanded the case.116 
Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter in Husky, believed that the 
“obtained by” language was meant by Congress to be an important 
limitation on the scope of Section 523(a)(2)(A) and argued that the majority 
improperly broadened the reach of the statute.117  He did not consider the 
“reliance” standard set forth in Field to be distinguishable from the case at 
hand.118  He argued that “actual fraud” “subsumes ‘false pretenses’ and 
‘false representations,’” and should therefore not be considered a separate 
cause of action.119  He concluded that if Congress had wanted a debtor to be 
prohibited from discharging debt concealed through a fraudulent 
conveyance, it would have written that language into the statute.120  Because 
Congress chose not to write this into the statute, Justice Thomas believed 
that the majority was overstepping its boundaries and into legislative 
territory by over-broadening the meaning of Section 523(a)(2)(A).121 
II.  ANALYSIS 
This Part will first discuss why the Supreme Court was correct in 
holding that actual fraud does not require a misrepresentation by a debtor to 
                                                          
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 1590. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id.   
 117.  Id. at 1590–94 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  The majority dispelled this argument by noting 
that “[n]othing in the text of § 523(a)(2) supports that additional requirement.”  Id. at 1589 
(majority opinion).   
 118.  Id. at 1592–93 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 119.  Id. at 1593.  
 120.  Id. at 1593–94. 
 121.  Id. at 1594. 
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its creditor.122  Next, it will posit that, while the Supreme Court was correct, 
its holding will apply to cases beyond Congress’s intended scope for 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) because of deficiencies inherent in the “badges of 
fraud” approach used by courts to evaluate fraudulent intent.123  It will then 
consider the need for a new standard of fraud and draw parallel objectives 
between Section 523(a)(2)(A) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (“PSLRA”).124  Finally, it will suggest that courts and legislatures 
should adopt the PSLRA’s “strong inference” of fraudulent intent pleading 
standard as the solution to the weaknesses using badges of fraud creates.125 
A.  The Supreme Court Decided the “Actual Fraud” Debate Correctly 
The Husky Court examined a very narrow issue: whether “actual 
fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) is limited to misrepresentations.126  The 
Court correctly found that actual fraud is not limited to misrepresentation.  
First, the common law, which Congress intended to codify by enacting the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, never limited actual fraud to 
misrepresentations.127  Second, according to statutory canons of 
construction, “or” phrases should be treated as expansive, rather than 
limiting.128  Third, limiting “actual fraud” to misrepresentations would 
allow debtors to discharge themselves of debt in ways that Congress did not 
intend.129 
1.  Common Law Meaning of “Actual Fraud” and Legislative 
Intent 
Most American law regarding fraudulent conveyances can trace its 
roots to Statute of 13 Elizabeth,130 which recognized fraudulent 
conveyances as activity done with intent to delay, hinder or defraud.131  
Because Statute of 13 Elizabeth has influenced so many American 
fraudulent conveyance statutes,132 it is a reasonable touchstone for a 
common law definition of fraud.133 
                                                          
 122.  See infra Part II.A. 
 123.  See infra Part II.B. 
 124.  See infra Part II.C; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012). 
 125.  See infra Part II.C.3–5. 
 126.  Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1585 (majority opinion). 
 127.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 128.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 129.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 130.  See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
 131.  Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587. 
 132.  See PETER A. ALCES, LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 5:32, Westlaw (database 
updated Aug. 2016) (discussing how both the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act and Uniform 
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Congress, when enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
intended for Section 523(a)(2)(A) to “codify current case law e.g., Neal v. 
Clark, which interprets ‘fraud’ to mean actual or positive fraud rather than 
fraud implied in law.”134  Congress was not concerned with limiting “fraud” 
to misrepresentation, but rather wanted to ensure that the statute penalized 
the correct level of intent.135  Because the common law meaning of “actual 
fraud” logically includes fraudulent conveyances136 and Congress did not 
intend to limit Section 523(a)(2)(A) to misrepresentations,137 the Supreme 
Court correctly found that the term “actual fraud” could include fraudulent 
conveyances. 
2.  Cannons of Construction 
There are two canons of construction used in statutory interpretation 
that further support the argument that the Supreme Court was accurate in its 
interpretation of Section 523(a)(2)(A).  First, courts should not render any 
terms in the statute as surplusage.138  That is, “a statute ought, upon the 
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or 
word will be superfluous, void, nugatory, or insignificant.”139  Because 
Congress specifically added the term “or actual fraud” in 1978140 and the 
term “misrepresentation” precedes “actual fraud” in a disjunctive list,141 if 
the Court had found “actual fraud” to be limited to misrepresentations, it 
would have rendered the phrase “or actual fraud” to be superfluous. 
                                                          
Fraudulent Transfer Act, along with several state fraudulent transfer statutes, have incorporated 
language from Statute of 13 Elizabeth). 
 133.  Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587. 
 134.  124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (1978) (citation omitted) (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 
(1887)). 
 135.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting the reason for including actual fraud 
was to capture actions perpetrated with “moral turpitude or intentional wrong”). 
 136.  Marie T. Reilly, The Latent Efficiency of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 57 LA. L. REV. 1213, 
1216 (1997) (discussing how actual fraud and fraudulent transfer law both have their roots in 
Statute 13 of Elizabeth).  
 137.  Congress’s choice to say it “added” actual fraud to 523(a)(2)(A), rather than saying it was 
using actual fraud to clarify or limit false pretenses or false representations, suggests that actual 
fraud is a different cause of action than false pretenses or false representation.  See S. REP. NO. 95-
989, at 78 (1978) (discussing that the provision excepting discharge where the debtor used false 
pretenses or false representations has been “modified only slightly” as “actual fraud is added as a 
ground for exception from discharge”).  
 138.  82 C.J.S. Statutes § 433 (2016). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 78 (1978) (“‘[A]ctual fraud’ is added as a ground for exception 
from discharge.”). 
 141.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).  A disjunctive list “express[es] an alternative or 
opposition between the meanings of the words connected.”  Disjunctive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY (2017). 
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The second relevant canon of construction is the meaning of the 
disjunctive article “or.”  “Or” is used to signify that “only one of the listed 
requirements need be satisfied.”142  This suggests that when Congress added 
“or actual fraud” to Section 523(a)(2)(A), it meant to expand the exceptions 
to discharge to include “actual fraud,” and not to limit the scope of the 
provision, as Justice Thomas suggested in his dissent.143  While some states 
did away with the distinction between “and” and “or,” there is generally no 
need to read a different meaning into an article unless it is necessary for the 
statute to reach its intended purpose.144  In Section 523(a)(2)(A), there is no 
need to read “or” to mean “and” or “by,” because Congress’s goal was to 
add actual fraud as a ground for exception to discharge.145 
3.  Consequences of Limiting “Actual Fraud” to 
Misrepresentations 
The purpose of the Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act, as mentioned 
above, is to balance the interests of debtors who need a fresh start and 
creditors who are rightfully owed repayment on their loans.146  Congress, in 
enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act, has created numerous exceptions to 
discharge where it finds the debtors are not entitled to a fresh start because 
of the debtors’ conduct.147  Congress could not have intended, when writing 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act, to allow debtors to escape fulfilling their 
obligations merely by moving their assets, as defendant Ritz did.148  If the 
Supreme Court had resolved Husky on different grounds, however, it would 
have been condoning such behavior.149  While Ritz argued that it would be 
redundant for Section 523(a)(2)(A) to be read this way when Section 
727(a)(2) exists,150 creditors need a remedy for fraudulent transfers 
occurring outside of the year before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, as was 
                                                          
 142.  LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 9 (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-
589.pdf. 
 143.  Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590–94 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
see also supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas’s dissenting 
opinion). 
 144.  See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEO. L.J. 341, 358 n.80, 360 (2010) (noting that “or” should be used in its disjunctive meaning 
unless the context of a statute clearly indicates otherwise). 
 145.  See supra note 137. 
 146.  See Understanding Bankruptcy, supra note 1. 
 147.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727, 1228(a), 1228(b), 1328(b) (2012).  
 148.  Experts Discuss Supreme Court’s Ruling in Husky International Electronics Inc. v. Ritz 
and Its Impact on Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, AM. BANKR. INST. (Dec. 18, 2016) 
[hereinafter Experts Discuss Husky], http://www.abi.org/educational-brief/experts-discuss-
supreme-courts-ruling-in-husky-international-electronics-inc-v. 
 149.  Id.   
 150.  Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1588–89 (2016). 
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the case in Husky.  Otherwise, creditors that extended credit years prior to a 
debtor filing bankruptcy, but who still rightfully expect to be repaid, would 
have no remedy.  Congress likely did not intend to permit discharge of debt 
related to fraudulent transfers simply because the debtor found a 
loophole.151 
B. Section 523(a)(2)(A), As Interpreted By Husky, Is Too Broad 
1.  Badges of Fraud 
Though the Supreme Court was correct in its decision that actual fraud 
is not limited to misrepresentations, concern over whether Section 
523(a)(2)(A) will become too far-reaching is well founded.152  Lower courts 
are starting to adopt Husky as precedent for fraudulent transfer bankruptcy 
cases beyond the Court’s narrow decision.153  Had the Court decided that 
actual fraud was limited to misrepresentations, there would be a bright line 
test to determine whether a debtor’s actions fell under Section 523(a)(2)(A), 
because a misrepresentation, by its nature, is an affirmative fraudulent act, 
done to a specific creditor.154  If the actual fraud involved is a fraudulent 
transfer rather than a misrepresentation, as in Husky, then one could argue 
that all of a debtor’s creditors are affected in the same way because the 
transfer has removed that amount of assets from the bankruptcy estate as a 
whole, disadvantaging all creditors.155 
Reservations about Husky are valid, not because actual fraud is broader 
than some circuits believed, but because of the common law standard of 
deciding whether a conveyance was fraudulent.156  Many state fraudulent 
transfer statutes, as well as the Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act, rely on 
circumstantial evidence referred to as “badges of fraud” to decide whether a 
                                                          
 151.  Andrew L. Van Houter, Reopening the Loophole: Avoiding Securities Fraud Debt 
Through Bankruptcy, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1713, 1716 (2012) (“The underpinning of 
[bankruptcy policy] is obvious; Congress created the discharge to give the honest debtor a fresh 
start, but the dishonest debtor deserves no such protection.”). 
 152.  Many experts think Husky “creates a lot more problems than it solves.”  Diane Davis, 
High Court’s Husky Is ‘Narrow,’ Leaves Unanswered Questions, 28 BLOOMBERG BANKR. L. 
REP. 671, 671 (2016); see also Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 148 (discussing bankruptcy 
expert Professor G. Eric Brunstad Jr.’s reservations on the Supreme Court’s decision in Husky). 
 153.  See, e.g., In re Thompson, 555 B.R. 1, 10 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2016) (expanding on issues 
unresolved by Husky and stating, “there is no requirement that a creditor rely on the actual fraud” 
or “that the debtor’s actual fraud induced the creditor”). 
 154.  Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 148 (opining that for actual fraud to be tied to a 
particular debt there should be a nexus between the two, i.e. a misrepresentation). 
 155.  Id. (Professor Casey, a supporter of the Supreme Court’s decision in Husky, admitting 
that other creditors of Chrysalis could have mounted a similar claim to Husky’s based on the 
Court’s decision). 
 156.  See infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text. 
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transferor transferred his assets fraudulently.157  If multiple badges of fraud 
are established, a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was fraudulent 
arises.158  Rebutting a presumption based upon broad generalizations can 
disadvantage vulnerable debtor defendants.159  As an example, this 
Comment will use Texas’s Business and Commerce Code, which has 
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), to demonstrate the 
breadth of badges of fraud and consequences that arise from using them.160  
The statute considers whether: 
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; (2) the debtor 
retained possession or control of the property transferred after the 
transfer; (3) the transfer or obligation was concealed; (4) before 
the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had 
been sued or threatened with suit; (5) the transfer was of 
substantially all the debtor’s assets; (6) the debtor absconded; (7) 
the debtor removed or concealed assets; (8) the value of the 
consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to 
the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation 
incurred; (9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; (10) 
the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial 
debt was incurred; and (11) the debtor transferred the essential 
assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an 
insider of the debtor.161 
The true purpose of excepting a debtor from discharge is to remove 
bankruptcy’s protections from one who intentionally remove assets from 
her creditor’s reach.162  In situations where debtors are vulnerable, however, 
the badges of fraud, listed above, are overly broad.163  While Neal v. Clark 
intended “actual fraud” to exclude “constructive fraud” and only include 
                                                          
 157.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (West 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 39-23.4 (West 2015); 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).  For a list of cases where “badges of fraud” have 
been used as an evaluative measure, see 3B BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYER’S EDITION 
§ 34:176, Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2017). 
 158.  Kelly v. Armstrong, 141 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 159.  Removing the misrepresentation requirement while still using a “badges of fraud 
approach . . . create[s] unjustified and unnecessary leverage in favor of creditors” because “[e]very 
constructive fraudulent conveyance will too readily become recast as ‘actual fraud.’”  Bankruptcy 
Attorneys’ Brief, supra note 12, at 5. 
 160.  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001 (West 1987). 
 161.  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (West 1987).  Other states have adopted similar 
provisions.  See generally 3B BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYERS EDITION, supra note 157, at 
§ 34:46 (discussing cases and statutes that use badges of fraud). 
 162.  Van Houter, supra note 151, at 1716 (noting that Congress’s goals in bankruptcy include 
“preventing dishonest fraudsters from evading liability by hiding behind the bankruptcy code.”). 
 163.  See infra Part II. 
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situations where debtors have malicious intent,164 using badges of fraud as 
evidence for actual fraud does exactly the opposite: it captures constructive 
fraud by looking to objective criteria, rather than intent.165  Using badges of 
fraud will encompass situations Congress never intended to be within the 
scope of Section 523(a)(2)(A).166  The following examples of cases that will 
now fall under Section 523(a)(2)(A) are a few that have caused the most 
concern for bankruptcy experts before, and in the wake of, Husky.167 
2.  Examples of Cases That Would Fall Within the Scope of Section 
523(a)(2)(A) Post-Husky 
a.  The Insolvent but Generous Family Member 
One situation that could arise if Section 523(a)(2)(A) continues to 
apply the badges of fraud approach has been discussed on several occasions 
by Professor G. Eric Brunstad, Jr.168  His major concern with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Husky is that it will capture innocent debtors whose 
situations, by chance rather than intent, meet several badges of fraud and, as 
lower income individuals are more vulnerable to predatory litigation by 
creditors.169  His illustration of this problem involves a destitute mother, on 
the verge of insolvency, whose son needs money for his own rent.170  She 
gives him what little cash she might have.171  This mother likely has no 
knowledge of the laws of bankruptcy or fraudulent transfers, but she may 
have met up to five badges of fraud.172  Specifically, she transferred money 
to an insider (her son); she likely did not alert her creditors, which would 
permit them to claim the transfer was concealed; she might have given her 
son the cash, even after a suit was filed against her because she valued 
helping her son over her creditors and did not understand the gravity of the 
situation; the transfer may have been most of the cash she had; or she might 
have been insolvent or became insolvent shortly after giving her son the 
money.173  While this mother might be uninformed, she likely did not intend 
                                                          
 164.  Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877). 
 165.  Bankruptcy Attorneys’ Brief, supra note 12, at 5 (“Every constructive fraudulent 
conveyance will too readily become recast as ‘actual fraud’ . . . .”). 
 166.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Professor Brunstad is a partner with Dechert LLP, a bankruptcy professor at NYU School 
of Law, and a contributor to the Collier treatise on bankruptcy law.  G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., 
DECHERT, LLP, https://www.dechert.com/eric_brunstad/ (last visited May 17, 2017). 
 169.  Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 148.  
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id.  
 172.  See supra text accompanying note 161 (listing the badges of fraud used by the State of 
Texas).  
 173.  Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 148. 
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to deceive her creditors.174  Rather, she felt she needed to meet her 
obligations of motherhood.175  This is a classic situation where a regular 
person needs bankruptcy to achieve a fresh start and likely not the type of 
situation that Congress intended to be excepted from discharge.176 
b.  Aggressive Creditor 
Other bankruptcy experts are concerned about the “unjustified and 
unnecessary leverage in favor of creditors” that the Court’s holding in 
Husky creates.177  They argue that including fraudulent transfers in Section 
523(a)(2)(A) will incentivize creditors to make loans to small business 
owners on the verge of bankruptcy.178  Then, almost any move the 
entrepreneurs make with the borrowed money in pursuit of reviving or 
expanding their business could fall within several badges of fraud.179  If the 
creditors can establish several badges of fraud and cast the business owner’s 
actions as constructively fraudulent, then the business owner will likely be 
unable to overcome that presumption because of the cost of litigation.180  If 
the business owners cannot rebut the presumption the creditors have 
created, the creditors have produced a win-win situation for themselves.  If 
the debtor can repay its debts, the creditors earn their fees.  If the debtor 
cannot pay its debts, the creditors can skim off the top of the bankruptcy 
estate by filing under Section 523(a)(2)(A).  When passing the Federal 
Bankruptcy Reform Act, Congress did not intend to hinder small 
businesses, but rather to encourage them by relieving them of debt when 
necessary.181  Congress could not have wanted creditors to have adversary 
claims against every move a business makes, which is why it put “actual,” 
and not “constructive,” fraud into the statute.182  This incongruity, again, 
demonstrates the insufficiency of the badges of fraud approach. 
                                                          
 174.  Id.  
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Van Houter, supra note 151. 
 177.  Bankruptcy Attorneys’ Brief, supra note 12, at 5.  
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 7. Badges of fraud that would likely be implicated in this situation include: 
transferred substantially all assets; removed or concealed assets; and became insolvent shortly 
after transfer was made.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 5 (“Every constructive fraudulent conveyance will too readily become recast as 
‘actual fraud.’”). 
 181.  APARNA MATHUR, BEYOND BANKRUPTCY: DOES THE BANKRUPTCY CODE PROVIDE A 
FRESH START TO ENTREPRENEURS? 2 (2011) (“[T]he bankruptcy procedure provides failed 
entrepreneurs the ability to get back on their feet by reducing or eliminating their pre-bankruptcy 
debts.”). 
 182.  124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (1978) (noting that Section 523(a)(2)(A) was intended to include 
actual or positive fraud, not constructive or implied fraud). 
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c.  Multiple Creditors 
The Court’s holding in Husky creates another quandary, unrelated to 
the application of badges of fraud, but still problematic because of the use 
of that standard.  Former Judge Eugene R. Wedoff posed the issue in a 
debate analyzing Husky before the Court issued its opinion.183  What 
happens if five creditors each give Company A $100 and Company A 
fraudulently transfers $250 of that $500 to Company B?184  If “actual fraud” 
was limited to misrepresentation, this kind of issue would not arise because 
the misrepresentation that caused the assets to be unavailable would be 
directed at a specific creditor.185  Because including fraudulent transfers in 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) opens the possibility for multiple creditors to initiate 
adverse proceedings on the same transfer, there needs to be a solution to 
this type of situation.186  Professor Anthony Casey suggests that all of these 
creditors should receive their pro rata share.187  The more creditors added to 
the scenario, however, the more complicated the situation becomes.188  If 
one hundred creditors make a claim to the transferred money, do they all 
have the same right to those assets?189  Will Section 523(a)(2)(A) need to 
accommodate class action suits?190  If one creditor can show she was 
harmed more directly than another (for example, that she lent money more 
closely to the time of filing for bankruptcy), is she entitled to a greater 
portion of those assets?191  Though this issue is more procedural and less 
substantially related to the badges of fraud, a new approach could solve this 
problem, too.192 
C.  A New Standard of Fraud—PSLRA’s “Strong Inference” Pleading 
Standard 
The current standard for evaluating fraud in a fraudulent transfer, 
which is now within the scope of Section 523(a)(2)(A), is insufficient.193  
                                                          
 183.  Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 183. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Removing the connection between the incurrence of the debt and the fraud makes Section 
523(a)(2)(A) a “general dischargeability provision.”  Id. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id.  Professor Anthony Casey is now a bankruptcy professor at the University of Chicago 
School of Law, after having been a bankruptcy partner at Kirkland & Ellis, LLP.  Anthony J. 
Casey, UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/casey (last visited 
May 17, 2017). 
 188.  Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 183. 
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Id.  
 191.  Id.  
 192.  See infra Part II. 
 193.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
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Badges of fraud are too broad and do not fulfill the intent of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act to capture only actual, and not constructive, fraud.194  Courts 
and legislatures could best meet Congress’s intentions by implementing a 
new standard of fraud for fraudulent conveyances, as is necessary in light of 
the Court’s holding in Husky.  This new standard must meet several criteria.  
It must protect the honest but unfortunate debtor, like the indigent mother in 
Professor Brunstad’s hypothetical.195  It must prevent aggressive creditors 
from manipulating small business owners into exception of discharge as a 
result of constructive fraud.196  It must also protect similarly situated 
creditors to settle some of the difficulties involved in Judge Wedoff’s 
scenario in which a class of creditors stake claim to the same set of 
assets.197  The new standard must give preference to the creditors actually 
harmed, not to parasitic creditors trying to jump their place in line. 
The new requirement must also effectuate Congress’s intention for 
“actual fraud” by only including acts committed with malicious intent and 
excluding acts that are merely constructively fraudulent.198  The badges of 
fraud approach, by using circumstantial evidence that might not be an 
indication of “moral turpitude,”199 fails to accomplish Congress’s purpose 
of adding “or actual fraud” into Section 523(a)(2)(A) and implicates many 
more parties than envisioned.200 
There is also a need for Congress to more clearly define its purpose for 
adding “actual fraud” to Section 523(a)(2)(A).  Other areas of the 
bankruptcy code, such as Section 548 involving fraudulent transfers, might 
soon be affected by the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”), the 
predecessor to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.201  The UVTA, as of 
2014, completely removes a requirement of fraud to qualify for relief.202  As 
states begin to adopt the UVTA, which does not require any showing of 
actual fraud, and courts interpret the reach of exceptions to discharge 
involving actual fraud following Husky, there will likely be considerable 
                                                          
 194.  See supra note 31. 
 195.  See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 196.  See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 197.  See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
 198.  124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (1978) (explaining that Congress’s intent for including Section 
523(a)(2)(A) was to capture actual fraud with harmful intent, not constructive fraud). 
 199.  Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. 
 200.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 201.  See, e.g., 2016 MICH. PUB. ACTS 552.  See generally Goodbye UFTA, Hello UVTA, 
PRACTICAL LAW FINANCE (July 24, 2014), WL Practical Law Article 7-575-2685 (discussing the 
amendments the Uniform Law Commission has made to the UFTA). 
 202.  Edwin E. Smith, The 2014 Amendments to the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (And, 
Before the Amendments, Known as the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act), 46 UCC L.J. 245 
(2015), 46 No. 3 UCC L. J. ART 5. 
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confusion in the bankruptcy field that needs to be addressed by a new 
standard. 
The objectives listed above can be satisfied by Congress taking action 
to create a new pleading standard for actual fraud under Section 
523(a)(2)(A) that replicates the PSLRA’s “strong inference” standard, 
discussed below.203  The PSLRA “strong inference” pleading standard 
should be adopted as the gatekeeper to litigation, rather than 
Section 523(a)(2)(A)’s “obtained by” language as Justice Thomas interprets 
it because the majority in Husky, though only in dictum, made clear that 
fraud is not necessary in the inducement of the extension of debt, a view 
that, because of this dictum, could quickly and easily become the general 
view.204  The strong inference standard would result in a holistic review of 
every situation,205 rather than making conclusions based on facts that might 
not be relevant to fraudulent intent.206 
1.  Brief Overview of Securities and Exchange Commision Acts and 
Rule 10b-5 
The Securities Act of 1933, also known as the “truth in securities act,” 
was passed to “provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities 
sold . . . and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof.”207  Congress then passed 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), “to provide for the 
regulation of securities exchanges and . . . to prevent inequitable and unfair 
practices on such exchanges and markets.”208  The 1934 Act also allows 
private litigants to bring securities claims.209  Private litigants typically 
bring securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 
10b of the 1934 Act.210  Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 make employing 
“manipulative and deceptive devices,” making untrue statements or 
omissions, or engaging in fraudulent or deceitful actions “in connection 
with the purchase of sale of any security” unlawful.211 
                                                          
 203.  See infra Part II. 
 204.  Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590–94 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
The majority dispelled Justice Thomas’s interpretation because “[n]othing in the text of [Section] 
523(a)(2) supports that additional requirement.”  Id. at 1589 (majority opinion).   
 205.  See infra Part II.C.3.  
 206.  Id. 
 207.  See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74. 
 208.  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881. 
 209.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012). 
 210.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).  
 211.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
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The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was passed in 1995 in 
“response to perceived abuses of securities fraud litigation.”212  When stock 
prices plummeted, classes of shareholders, led by lawyers, brought 
frivolous suits that corporations would settle simply to avoid costly 
litigation.213  While Congress knew it needed to find a way to curb 
meaningless suits, it also sought to protect shareholders’ ability to recover 
on meritorious claims.214  What follows is a discussion on how Congress 
struck that balance in the PSLRA, how the Court further clarified this 
legislation, and how the PSLRA’s objectives were similar to the solutions 
needed for Section 523(a)(2)(A) after Husky.215  This Comment contends 
that the PSLRA standard of pleading fraud is the right answer for how 
courts and legislatures should interpret fraudulent transfers in the 
bankruptcy context.216 
2.  The PSLRA Requirements and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd. 
The PSLRA states that “plaintiffs must ‘state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind,’” rather than only satisfying the requirement of Rule 9(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.217  Congress intended for the term 
“strong inference” to be a more stringent requirement than “generally” 
pleading scienter.218  It did not, however, define what it meant by “strong 
inference.”219  This led courts in different circuits to develop their own 
standards of strong inference until the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.220 
                                                          
 212.  Sharon Nelles & Hilary Huber, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 653, 653 (2014) (quoting Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 
230 F.R.D. 250, 258 (D. Mass. 2005)); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (enumerating requirements for private individuals to bring 
securities law suits to reduce abusive litigation). 
 213.  Nelles & Huber, supra note 212, at 653–54. 
 214.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
 215.  See infra Parts II.C.2 and II.C.3. 
 216.  See infra Part II.C.4. 
 217.  Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 314 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2)).  Rule 9(b) requires, “[i]n 
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake.  Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 
generally.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 218.  Scienter is “the defendant’s intention ‘to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’”  Tellabs, Inc., 
551 U.S. at 313 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12, 194 (1976)). 
 219.  Id. at 314. 
 220.  For example, before Tellabs, the Sixth Circuit evaluated whether there was a “strong 
inference” of fraud by assessing competing inferences to determine which was the most plausible, 
while the Seventh Circuit examined all allegations and then decided “whether collectively they 
establish such an inference.”  Id. at 317. 
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In Tellabs, the plaintiff alleged that Tellabs, and derivatively, its CEO 
and President, Richard Notebaert, violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 
and SEC Rule 10b-5.221  The plaintiff alleged that Tellabs lied to the 
investing public about the value of Tellabs’ stock, the success of the 
company’s operations, and its financials through misrepresentations.222  
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that “strong inference” 
under the PSLRA required a “cogent” inference of scienter that is “at least 
as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts 
alleged.”223  Additionally, the allegations must not be taken in isolation, but 
looked at together to determine “whether all of the facts alleged, taken 
collectively, give rise to strong inference of scienter.”224  The Supreme 
Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case 
for evaluation under the newly articulated pleading standard.225 
3.  Common Objectives of PSLRA and Section 523(a)(2)(A) 
Congress faced similar issues when creating a new pleading standard 
for the PSLRA as they now face after Husky’s broad interpretation of 
Section 523(a)(2)(A).  Both statutes arise out of a need to protect the rights 
of plaintiffs who feel that they have been taken advantage of through fraud.  
But both also address the need to balance those rights against the rights of 
vulnerable defendants who may be subject to attack under these laws when 
they have been operating legally.226  The PSLRA recognizes that the federal 
securities laws are open to abuses by those trying to take advantage of the 
system.227  For example, before the PSLRA was enacted, private litigants 
frequently initiated “strike suits,”228 which sought to take advantage of large 
corporations who would find it quicker and easier to settle with a client for 
the “nuisance value” of the case rather than be threatened with potential 
                                                          
 221.  Id. at 315–17. 
 222.  Id. at 313–14. 
 223.  Id. at 324. 
 224.  Id. at 323. 
 225.  Id. at 329. 
 226.  EDWARD LABATON & NICOLE M. ZEISS, INTERPRETING THE PSLRA’S PLEADING 
REQUIREMENTS AND LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISIONS (AM. LAW INST. 2002), Westlaw (“The 
enactment of the PSLRA flowed from the perception, or misperception, that securities class 
actions had become primarily controlled by plaintiffs’ attorneys without, at times, sufficient 
regard for actionable culpability of the defendants.”); see supra note 1. 
 227.  Congress passed the PSLRA to “prevent the abuse of federal securities laws by private 
plaintiffs.”  Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 228.  A strike suit is a “suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid claim, brought 
either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.”  Suit, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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litigation.229  By elevating the required standard of pleading, Congress 
removed the incentive to bring strike suits because plaintiffs would have to 
actually demonstrate there was a “strong inference” of scienter, rather than 
freely bring claims simply because a corporation’s stock price decreased.230 
A similar need exists in limiting the scope of potential claims under 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) now that the Court, in Husky, found there is no 
misrepresentation limitation for actual fraud.231  The PSLRA and the Court 
in Tellabs attempted to strike a balance between the rights of plaintiffs who 
were truly harmed by fraudulent securities offerors and corporations acting 
legally, but subjected to the ebbs and flows of the market and imperfect 
business decisions.  The courts and legislatures now need to find a balance 
between the rights of those who extended credit in good faith and expected 
to be repaid with the rights of vulnerable debtors who actually need the 
protection of bankruptcy to get a fresh start.232  Because the standards of 
fraud approach to evaluating the existence of actual fraud is too broad, like 
the fraud pleading requirements in private securities litigation before the 
PSLRA, adopting a standard akin to the PSLRA’s could better protect the 
rights of creditors and debtors. 
By adopting the Court’s interpretation of “strong inference” of 
fraudulent intent in Tellabs as the standard for assessing whether a transfer 
falls within the scope of “actual fraud,” the burden on defendants whose 
actions appear to constitute “actual fraud” under the badges of fraud test, 
but who actually act with honest intentions will be relieved.  Judges and 
juries would have the power, instead of merely identifying whether certain 
outward indicia exist, to actually evaluate the situation as a whole and 
determine whether the defendant’s conduct was that of fraud or simply that 
of someone with an immense financial burden with no other way to turn. 
4.  The Benefits of Adopting Tellabs’ Pleading Standard for Section 
523(a)(2)(A) Outweigh Concerns of Its Efficacy in the 
Securities Context 
Though there are valid concerns with Tellabs’s “strong inference” test, 
they will not be as problematic when applied to Section 523(a)(2)(A) for 
                                                          
 229.  Nuisance value abuses involve “nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, 
vexatious discovery requests and manipulation by class action lawyers.”  Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 
320 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)). 
 230.  Id. at 313 (“Exacting pleading requirements are among the control measures Congress 
included in the PSLRA.”). 
 231.  Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590 (2016) (“[W]e interpret ‘actual 
fraud’ to encompass fraudulent conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a 
false representation.”). 
 232.  See Understanding Bankruptcy, supra note 1. 
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several reasons.233  First, while the expansion of “actual fraud” under 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) may lead to more litigation, it is a relatively narrow 
issue.234  And, although the PSLRA was created as a global solution to 
improve and restrain all private securities litigation, the “actual fraud” 
element of Section 523(a)(2)(A) will only apply where a fraudulent transfer 
did not occur within one year of the defendant filing for bankruptcy,235 and 
where there was no misrepresentation.236  If either of these circumstances 
are present, there will be a bright line test to determine liability which will 
not require the same depth of consideration. 
Additionally, using the “strong inference” pleading standard as a 
gatekeeping function would clarify confusion that could stem from the 
adoption of the UVTA and its omission of a fraud requirement.237  At least 
one court, for example, has issued an opinion that obscured the distinction 
between states that require fraud and those that do not.238  The confusion 
regarding the diminishing role of fraud in the UVTA, compounded by 
Husky heightening the importance of actual fraud, further demonstrates the 
necessity that Congress affirmatively enact a new pleading standard to 
eliminate any doubt about its objectives regarding the addition of “actual 
fraud” to Section 523(a)(2)(A).  Just as Congress enacted a pleading 
standard for the PSLRA separate from other securities laws, it could do the 
same for this narrow element of Section 523(a)(2)(A).239 
5.  Benefits of Using the Strong Inference Standard 
Using the strong inference test from the PSLRA instead of the badges 
of fraud test can, first, cure some of the reservations experts have had about 
                                                          
 233.  See infra notes 234–239 and accompanying text.  See generally Arunesh Sohi, Circuits in 
Disarray Before and After Tellabs v. Makor: A Call For the Supreme Court to Weigh in on 
Securities Fraud Pleading Requirements Again, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (2010) (discussing the 
changes circuits have made since Tellabs and how, even after making changes, the circuits are still 
not in agreement on how to treat the “strong inference” standard). 
 234.  Diane Davis, High Court’s Husky Is ‘Narrow,’ Leaves Unanswered Questions, 28 
BLOOMBERG BANKR. L. REP. 671, 671 (2016) (observing that while Husky might “create more 
problems than it solves,” the facts involved in cases implicating Husky’s decision are unique). 
 235.  There is no need for an “actual fraud” inquiry if the transfer occurred within one year of 
the creditor filing its petition.  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (2012).  
 236.  There is no need for an “actual fraud” inquiry if there has been an express 
misrepresentation because that is already listed as its own cause of action under the statute.  See 
id. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 237.  See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 238.  See, e.g., In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., No. 12-CV-2652, 2017 WL 
82391 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017). 
 239.  According to Bankruptcy Rule 7009, Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
applies to adversary proceedings.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 7009; see also supra note 217 (discussing 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b) and Congress’s separate pleading standard for the 
PSLRA). 
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the Court’s holding in Husky and, second, address the growing divergence 
in the meaning and use of actual fraud in bankruptcy.  In Professor 
Brunstad’s scenario, the crux of the problem was that the nearly insolvent 
mother who lent her son money for rent had no fraudulent intent and likely 
did not know that what she was doing could possibly subject her to an 
exception from discharge.240  Under the badges of fraud test, though, the 
satisfaction of badges of fraud would require her to bear the heavy burden 
of overcoming a rebuttable presumption of fraud.  If a court uses the strong 
inference test, she would only have to prove that a reasonable person would 
find her acting with fraudulent intent less likely than her acting with an 
innocent frame of mind, arguably a lighter load to bear.  In the National 
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney’s amicus brief in support of 
Ritz, experts worried that creditors would use their superior bargaining 
power to manipulate debtors, especially small and new business owners, 
into situations where they could make transfers that would constitute 
several badges of fraud while taking risks to revive their businesses.241  
Similar to Professor Brunstad’s example above, the small business owners 
would have an easier job of proving their innocent frame of mind under a 
strong inference test than with badges of fraud.  Additionally, if creditors 
know that the debtors would have an easier time of proving their innocent 
frame of mind in court, they might not extend predatory loans to those 
businesses because their chances of having priority in the debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate will be significantly decreased. 
Judge Wedoff’s concern over how courts will apply Section 
523(a)(2)(A) when multiple creditors claim they were affected by the same 
fraudulent transfer is likely the trickiest of the issues posed.  This too, 
however, can be at least partially remedied by using the PSLRA’s strong 
inference test.  By giving the judge or jury more power to look into the 
totality of the circumstances, rather than just tallying how many badges of 
fraud are involved in a situation, they can look more deeply into how a 
debtor’s scienter, or lack thereof, relates to any of the creditors filing 
adverse proceedings individually.  A judge or jury could consider the 
circumstances and try to understand the state of mind of the debtor, which 
would allow it to determine whether the fraudulent transfer was 
intentionally done to defraud or disadvantage a specific creditor more so 
than others. 
The benefits of the strong inference standard would also apply to the 
Husky case.  Rather than looking to which badges of fraud Ritz met, the 
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Court could look broadly at all of his business endeavors,242 his lack of 
trustworthiness,243 and the circumstances of his relationship with Husky.244  
It would then be much easier for a judge or jury to find that Ritz did act 
with scienter and that his debt to Husky should not be discharged. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Husky came to the correct conclusion in holding 
that “actual fraud” does not require a misrepresentation by the debtor to the 
creditor.245  This decision, however, will likely do little to stem the tide of 
litigation arising out of Section 523(a)(2)(A).246  As long as courts and 
legislatures continue to use the “badges of fraud” approach in determining 
whether a debtor has engaged in “actual fraud,” creditors will continue to 
hale innocent but vulnerable debtors into court or force settlements outside 
of court where predatory creditors take advantage of the vulnerability of the 
debtors who truly do need the protection that bankruptcy provides.247 
If Congress adopted the “strong inference” pleading standard used in 
private securities litigation, courts would have to do a more searching 
inquiry into the actual motives and intentions of debtors.  The new standard 
would avoid excepting from discharge the debts of a variety of groups of 
innocent debtors, like the ones discussed above.248  Congress, in making 
this change, would preserve the meaning of “actual fraud” and clarify its 
intentions in adding the “actual fraud” language to Section 523(a)(2)(A), 
while reducing the volume of related litigation and the potential for 
innocent debtors to be unfairly strong-armed by their creditors. 
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